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Comments
CHILD SUPPORT IN MISSOURI: THE FATHER'S DUTY,
THE CHILD'S RIGHT AND THE MOTHER'S
ABILITY TO ENFORCE
The obligation of a father to provide support for his children has
long been established in Missouri. Unlike common law, which considered
it only a moral duty,1 Missouri law recognizes the duty of support as a
legal obligation. While many American states altered the common law
position by statute, in the absence of legislative help courts have declared
the duty to be legally enforceable by relying on natural theories of legal
reasoning. 2 Thus, in 1881, the Missouri Supreme Court said in In re
Scarritt:3
The father owes a duty to nurture, support, educate and protect
his child, and the child has the right to call on him for the discharge
of this duty. These obligations and rights are imposed and con-
ferred by the laws of nature; and public policy, for the good of
society, will not permit or allow the father to irrevocably divest
himself of or to abandon them at his mere will or pleasure.4
This obligation exists between father and child, the father having a
duty to provide support, and the child having the right to receive supp6rt
from his father. The enforceability of the obligation, however, does not
run in a parallel manner. In Worthington v. Worthington,5 a guardian
acting in behalf of seven minor children attempted to enforce the children's
right of support against their father; the St. Louis Court of Appeals af-
firmed the father's demurrer. The court held that even though the father's
duty to support his children was a legal duty, no cause of action is recog-
nized in the children themselves. The underlying concept in equity was
that the stability of families would be threatened if dissatisfied children
could sue their father.
The result of recognizing the child's legal right to support, while deny-
ing him any direct remedy, is that the duty can be enforced only by third
parties acting for the benefit of the child. Probably the most common and
most logical person to enforce this duty is the child's mother. The objective
of this comment is to summarize and analyze the ability of a minor child's
mother to enforce his right of support against the the child's father. To
make this attainable, the scope has been limited to consideration of the
situation where all three parties-father, mother, and child-are residents
of Missouri.
1. English cases are considered and cited by the New Hampshire Supreme
Court in Kelley v. Davis, 49 N.H. 187 (1870).
2. These are discussed by the St. Louis Court of Appeals in State ex rel.
Kramer v. Carroll, 309 S.W.2d 654, 658-59 (St. L. Mo. App. 1958). See also Brosius
v. Barker, 154 Mo. App. 657, 662, 136 S.W. 18, 19 (Spr. Ct. App. 1911).
3. 76 Mo. 565 (1882).
4. Id. at 584.
5. 212 Mo. App. 216, 253 S.W. 443 (St. L. Ct. App. 1923).
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Since R . v. R___2 a 1968 Missouri Supreme Court decision, both
legitimate and illegitimate children apparently have had the right to support
from their fathers. Prior to this time the right had been recognized only in
the case of legitimate children, and Missouri law had held that the duty
to support an illegitimate child fell on its mother.7 Because of this earlier
distinction, the situations of the legitimate child and the illegitimate child
will be considered separately.
I. THE LEGrrIMATE CHMD
A. The Child's Right to Support
The basic right of the child to support and the duty of a father to pro-
vide that support is the same today as it was at common law. The duty
arises at birth and continues until the death of the father s or the emancipa-
tion of the child,9 whichever occurs first.
In the case of the death of the father there is no difficulty in placing
the termination of the duty of support at a specific point in time; emancipa-
tion, however, presents a more difficult problem. Because the concept of
emancipation is important in other legal contexts,' 0 it is often described
in language which is not well suited to the issue of the right to support.
Emancipation is defined as the voluntary termination of the parent-child
relationship." The existence or termination of that relationship is solely
a question of fact to be determined by the jury.'2 An emancipation can be
shown by express agreement between the parent and child, or implied from
the actions of the parties.'3 The ultimate question of fact is whether the
parent and child have agreed to dissolve the mutual obligations between
them which arise out of the parent-child relationship, one of which is the
father's duty of support.' 4
There are several factual situations which raise presumptions as to
the existence of an emancipation. Due to the interdependence of the duty
6. As explained in Part II of this comment, the Missouri Supreme Court in
R . v. R_.._, 431 S.W.2d 152 (1968), held that an illegitimate child has a right
of support from his father, a substantial change in Missouri law.
7. James - v. Hutton, 373 S.W.2d 167 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963); Easley v.
Gordon, 51 Mo. App. 637 (St. L. Ct. App. 1892).
8. Gardine v. Cottey, 360 Mo. 681, 230 S.W.2d 731 (En Banc 1950). In its
opinion the court noted that although the duty normally terminated with the
fathers death, the father could extend the obligation beyond his death by con-
tractual agreement.
9. Steckler v. Steckler, 293 S.W.2d 129 (Spr. Mo. App. 1956); Green v. Green,
234 S.W.2d 350 (St. L. Mo. App. 1950); Swenson v. Swenson, 241 Mo. App. 21,
227 S.W.2d 103 (K.C. Ct. App. 1950).
10. Only an emancipated minor can sue his parent for an unintential tort.
Wurth v. Wurth, 322 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. En Banc 1959). A parent can sue in behalf
of a minor child for injuries to the child only if he is unemancipated. Beebe v.
Kansas City, 223 Mo. App. 642, 17 S.W.2d 608 (K.C. Ct. App. 1929). Only an
emancipated minor can establish an independent residence for purposes of di-
versity jurisdiction in federal courts. Spurgeon v. Mission State Bank, 151 F.2d 702(8th Cir. 1945). This list is only illustrative, not exhaustive.
11. Wurth v. Wurth, 322 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. En Banc 1959).
12. Spurgeon v. Mission State Bank, 151 F.2d 702 (8th Cir. 1945).
13. Id.
14. Id.; Wurth v. Wurth, 322 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. En Banc 1959).
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to support and the fact of emancipation, the issue of whether an emancipa-
don occurred, as a practical matter, is determined by the presumptions.1 5
The basic presumption is that a child is emancipated when he attains the
age of legal majority.16 Where a child under the age of legal majority
marries, however, he will also be presumed emancipated because he has
assumed obligations which take priority over those of the parent-child re-
lationship.1 7 This same rationale is used to find a presumption of emanci-
pation when a child joins a branch of the armed forces.' s The child's first
obligation, because of his marriage or membership in the armed forces, is
directed to some person or object other than his father, and, likewise, that
other person or organization assumes obligations in 'return concerning the
needs and welfare of the child which before the emancipation were the
responsibility of the father. The underlying theory as it developed at
common law was that in return for his duty of support, a father was en-
titled to the custody and earnings of the child.1 9 After emancipation, the
father is denied both the custody of the child and the right to the child's
earnings; he is therefore relieved of his corresponding duty of support.
It is also possible for the child by his wrongful behavior to waive his
right to support. The only Missouri case to consider this possibility de-
cided, as a matter of first impression, that where the father had rightful
custody and had adequately provided for his four sons, their actions in
leaving the home of the father and going to live with their mother was a
waiver of their right to support from their father.2 0 In the situation be-
fore the court, the mother was attempting to enforce the duty by seeking
to recover her expenses of supporting the four boys over whom she did not
have legal custody. Therefore, in finding that the sons had waived their
right to support, the court neither inflicted upon them financial losses
nor left them without means of support, since even if their mother refused
to support them in the future they could probably return to the home of
their father.
B. Enforcing the Right
A mother has two alternatives in seeking to enforce her child's right
to support from his father. She may provide support herself and seek re-
15. Even in the area of child support additional facts may rebut the presump-
tion. Thus, in State ex rel. Kramer v. Carroll, 309 S.W.2d 654, 658-59 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1958), the court held that the duty to support a physically incapacitated child
extends beyond the age of legal majority. Here the child was presumed emancipated
by her age, but, since she was not physically able to be "emancipated," the pre-
sumption was overcome. The court, however, did not analyze the situation strictly
in terms of emancipation, and thereby avoided much confusion.
16. Green v. Green, 234 S.W.2d 350 (St. L. Mo. App. 1950). But see State
ex rel. Kramer v. Carroll, 309 S.W.2d 654 (St. L. Mo. App. 1958), which held that
the duty of support extended past the age of legal majority because the child was
incapacitated by epilepsy and unable to care for herself.
17. Steckler v. Steckler, 293 S.W.2d 129 (Spr. Mo. App. 1956); Green v.
Green, 234 S.W.2d 350 (St. L. Mo. App. 1950).
18. Schaffer v. Security Fire Door Co., 326 S.W.2d 376 (St. L. Mo. App. 1959);
Swenson v. Swenson, 241 Mo. App. 21, 227 S.W.2d 103 (K.C. Ct. App. 1950).
19. Swenson v. Swenson, 241 Mo. App. 21, 227 S.W.2d 103 (K.C. Ct. App.
1950); Rankin v. Rankin, 83 Mo. App. 335 (St. L. Ct. App. 1900).
20. Wills v. Barker, 240 Mo. App. 705, 214 S.W.2d 748 (K.C. Ct. App. 1948).
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imbursement in the "common law suit,"21 or she may seek a decree in con-
junction with a proceeding for divorce or separate maintenance requiring
a continuing payment by the father for the support of the child. The ab-
sence of any remedy available until after the breakup of the family is
again explained by the equitable doctrine of not allowing suits between
members of existing families, because of their disruptive effect. 22
1. Common Law Suit
Traditionally, a mother has been entitled to recover the cost of sup-
porting her child by suit against the child's father for amounts expended. 23
To recover she must first show that she has proper custody, and, second,
prove her expenditures in providing necessaries for the child.
The burden of showing proper custody is minimal, and this require-
ment is almost always satisfied unless her custody has been affirmatively
wrongful. A court decree giving custody to the mother will, of course,
satisfy this requirement. 24 In the absence of a formal court decree, the
mother can almost always show proper custody by consent of the father
through his words or actions.25 The mere failure of the father to seek
custody through the courts is evidently considered consent on his part.26
The only Missouri case excusing the father for his failure to seek custody
through a court proceeding is Assman v. Assman,2 7 where the father would
have had to go to New York to assert his claims to custody. But in Dolvin v.
Schimmel,28 where the mother induced the child to leave his father and
took him to a third party's home and promised the third party compensa-
tion for temporarily keeping the child, the father was unable to defeat
the third party's claim for amounts owing because he had failed to attempt
to locate his son or get him back. It is probably safe to assume that had the
mother, rather than a third party, been seeking reimbursement, the court
21. While such a suit could not have existed under common law because the
obligation of support was not recognized as a legal duty, courts nevertheless refer
to a suit by the mother against the father for past expenses of support as a "common
law suit." Occasionally, the fact that this legal duty was judicially established is over-
looked by a court. See, e.g., Robinson v. Robinson, 268 Mo. 703, 709, 186 S.W. 1032,
1033 (1916); Anderson v. Anderson, 437 S.W.2d 704, 709 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969).
22. Worthington v. Worthington, 212 Mo. App. 216, 218-19, 253 S.W. 443St. L. Ct. App. 1923), quoting Rawlings v. Rawlings, 121 Miss. 140, 83 So. 146
1919).
23. Clark v. Routt, 453 S.W.2d 656 (Spr. Mo. App. 1970); Broemmer v. Broem-
mer, 219 S.W.2d 300 (St. L. Mo. App. 1949); Bennett v. Robinson, 180 Mo. App. 56,
165 S.W. 856 (Spr. Ct App. 1914); Rankin v. Rankin, 83 Mo. App. 335 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1900).
24. Broemmer v. Broemmer, 219 S.W.2d 300 (St. L. Mo. App. 1949); Bennett
v. Robinson, 180 Mo. App. 56, 165 S.W. 856 (Spr. Ct. App. 1914).
25. Often where the husband-father's consent is obvious, such as where thefather has abandoned his family, the courts fail to even mention that the mother
had lawful custody by consent. The father's conduct in abandoning the family
obviously implies consent. Berkley v. Berkley, 246 S.W.2d 804 (Mo. 1952); Rankin
v. Rankin, 83 Mo. App. 335 (St. L. Ct. App. 1900).
26. Dolvin v. Schimmel, 284 S.W. 811 (St. L. Mo. App. 1926); Assman v.Assman, 192 Mo. App. 678, 179 S.W. 957 (St. L. Ct. App. 1915).
27. 192 Mo. App. 678, 179 S.W. 957 (St. L. Ct. App. 1915).
28. 284 S.W. 811 (St. L. Mo. App. 1926).
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would not have found consent on the part of the father so easily. However,
in the absence of an outright attempt to avoid the father and conceal the
child, dicta in Assman2 9 indicates that anything less than legal proceedings
might well be characterized as consent by Missouri courts.
After showing that she has had proper custody of the child, a mother
need only show the amounts expended in providing the child's necessaries
to obtain recovery from the father.3 0 No exact accounting is required, as in
a suit by creditors, 31 and the issues of the father's standard of living or
ability to pay are not considered. The amount of recovery is determined only
by the cost of the necessaries provided. Missouri courts have been reluctant
to issue a comprehensive list of what constitutes necessaries, but in Josey v.
Forde32 the Missouri Supreme Court said:
'[N]ecessaries' include food, drink, clothing, washing, medicine,
instruction, suitable place of residence, and in nearly every family
some comforts in excess of the strict necessities of life are enjoyed
and treated as necessaries. 33
The common law suit for necessaries provided is a relatively inex-
pensive and expeditious method of enforcing the right of the child when the
defendant father is subject to jurisdiction and has the means to satisfy a
lump sum judgment. The primary disadvantage as compared with the
judgment for continuing payments of support is that the mother must
have independent means to initially pay for the child's support, and suits
must be brought periodically to recover as the amount of support provided
accrues. While the decree for continuing payments is the preferred remedy
in a divorce or separate maintenance situation, the common law suit is
still useful to recover amounts expended before an order of support is ob-
tained,34 or for amounts expended after the running of the statute of limita-
tions on a judgment for continuing payment.3 5
2. Judicial Order in Conjunction with Divorce or Separate Maintenance
A judicial order against the father for support and maintenance of
minor children is available under the statute pertaining to orders in lroceed-
ings for divorce (section 452.070, RSMo 1969).36 The court has authority37 to
29. 192 Mo. App. 678, 684, 179 S.W. 957, 958 (St. L. Ct. App. 1915).
80. Clark v. Routt, 458 S.W.2d 656 (Spr. Mo. App. 1970); Broemmer v. Broem-
mer, 219 S.W.2d 800 (St. L. Mo. App. 1949); Bennett v. Robinson, 180 Mo. App. 56,
165 S.W. 856 (Spr. Ct. App. 1914); Rankin v. Rankin, 83 Mo. App. 385 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1900).
81. Josey v. Forde, 388 S.W.2d 14 (Mo. 1960).
82. Id.
88. Id. at 15.
84. Kelly v. Kelly, 829 Mo. 992, 47 S.W.2d 762 (En Banc 1932); Clark v. Routt,
453 S.W.2d 656 (Spr. Mo. App. 1970); Bennett v. Robinson, 180 Mo. App. 56,
165 S.W. 856 (Spr. Ct. App. 1914).
85. Hohier v. Fuchs, 156 S.W.2d 21 (St. L. Mo. App. 1941).
86. § 452.070, RSMo 1969:
When a divorce shall be adjudged, the court shall make such order touch-
ing the alimony and maintenance of the wife, and the care, custody and
maintenance of the children, or any of them, as from the circumstances of
the parties and the nature of the case, shall be reasonable, and when the
1971]
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issue an order of support whenever custody has been awarded to the mother,
and a divorce is granted.38 Other Missouri statutes which should also au-
thorize an order of support, the separate maintenance statute 9 and those
pertaining to the determination of custody between parents who are liv-
ing apart,40 are not included within the language of section 452.070, and
wife is plaintiff, may order the defendant to give security for such alimony
and maintenance; and upon his neglect to give the security required of
him, or upon default of himself and his sureties, if any there be, to pay
or provide such alimony and maintenance, may award an execution for
the collection thereof, or enforce the performance of the judgment or order
by sequestration of property, or by such other lawful ways and means as is
according to the practice of the court. The court, on the application of
either party, may make such alteration, from time to time, as to the al-
lowance of alimony and maintenance, as may be proper, and the court
may decree alimony pending the suit for divorce in all cases where the
same would be just, whether the wife be plaintiff or defendant, and en-
force such order in the manner provided by law in other cases.
37. A court has authority to make an order concerning child support when-
ever the issue of custody is determined in a divorce proceeding and the divorce isgranted. Thus, in Allen v. Allen, 433 S.W.2d 580 (K.C. Mo. App. 1968), an order
of support was upheld even though the pleadings contained no prayer for relief.
Prior cases had been to the contrary; see, e.g., Lambert v. Lambert, 222 S.W.2d 544(St. L. Mo. App. 1949).
38. A court has no authority under § 452.070, RSMo 1969 to enter an orderfor child support when the divorce is not granted. Rogers v. Rogers, 399 S.W.2d
606 (K.C. Mo. App. 1966).
39. § 452.130, RSMo 1969:
When the husband, without good cause, shall abandon his wife, and
refuse or neglect to maintain and provide for her, the circuit court, on her
petition for that purpose, shall order and adjudge such support and main-
tenance to be provided and paid by the husband for the wife and her chil-
dren, or any of them, by that marriage, out of his property, and for such
time as the nature of the case and the circumstances of the parties shall
require, and compel the husband to give security for such maintenance,
and from time to time make such further orders touching the same as
shall be just, and enforce such judgment by execution, sequestration ofproperty, or by such other lawful means as are in accordance with the prac-
tice of the court; and as long as said maintenance is continued, the hus-band shall not be charged with the wife's debts, contracted after thejudgment for such maintenance.
40. §§ 452.150, .160, RSMo 1969. § 452.150:
The father and mother living apart are entitled to an adjudication of
the circuit court as to their powers, rights and duties in respect to the
custody and control and the services and earnings and management of
the property of their unmarried minor children without any preference
as between the said father and mother, and neither the father nor the
mother has any right paramount to that of the other in respect to the cus-
tody and control or the services and earnings or of the management to theproperty of their said unmarried minor children; pending such adjudica-
tion the father or mother who actually has the custody and control of said
unmarried minor children shall have the sole right to the custody and
control and to the services and earnings and to the management of the
property of said unmarried minor children.
§ 452.160:
The terms of section 452.150 shall apply to children born out of wed-
lock and to children born in wedlock, and the terms "father and mother,"
"parent," "child," shall apply without reference to whether a child was
born in lawful wedlock.
[Vol. 36
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contain no similar provision of their own. However, several cases indicate
that judgments concerning child support may be given in conjunction with
suits for separate maintenance. 41 Evidently no cases are reported in which
support was sought in conjunction with a determination of custody,42 ex-
cept for cases in which the statutes were unsuccessfully used as a basis to
argue that the obligation of the father to support an illegitimate child had
been compelled by the legislature.43 Though the Missouri courts talk of
authority to dedare a continuing judgment of child support as being strictly
limited to the situations enumerated in section 452.070, their decisions in
granting such orders in the separate maintenance situation would seem to
speak to the contrary.44
An order for continuing payment of child support is a prior judicial
determination of the magnitude of the duty of a father, and compliance
with the order is full satisfaction of the duty of support.4 It is not necessary
for such an order to be issued with the divorce decree.46 Anytime after the
divorce, a mother can seek a modification of the decree to allow for
child support.4 7 However, once an order of support is given, a mother is no
longer able to sue at common law to recover for necessaries she may have
to provide if the father fails to satisfy his obligation under the order.48
Her only remedy after issuance of an order of support is to seek execution on
the order of support itself. This does not prevent her from seeking reim-
bursement after the order for amounts expended to provide necessaries
prior to the order,49 or for necessaries provided after the statute of limita-
tions has run on the order.5 0 The Missouri Supreme Court has characterized
the remedies as "coterminious," 5' meaning that from the point in time
when the order of continuing support is given, support owed from periods
41. Genazzi v. Genazzi, 343 S.W.2d 686 (St. L. Mo. App. 1961); Miller v.
Miller, 241 S.W.2d 805 (St. L. Mo. App. 1951); Carder v. Carder, 227 Mo. App.
1005, 60 S.W.2d 706 (K.C. Ct. App. 1933).
42. See annots., Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 452.150-.160 (Vernon 1952).
43. Heembrock v. Stevenson, 387 S.W.2d 263 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965); State
ex rel. Canfield v. Porterfield, 222 Mo. App. 553, 292 S.W. 85 (K.C. Ct. App.
1927).
44. See, e.g., Rogers v. Rogers, 399 S.W.2d 606 (K.C. Mo. App. 1966).
45. Lodahl v. Papenberg, 277 S.W.2d 548 (Mo. 1955); Clark v. Routt, 453
S.W.2d 656 (Spr. Mo. App. 1970); Hunter v. Schwertfeger, 407 S.W.2d 606 (Spr.
Mo. App. 1966).
46. Kelly v. Kelly, 329 Mo. 992, 47 S.W.2d 762 (1932); Hunter v. Schwert-
feger, 407 S.W.2d 606 (Spr. Mo. App. 1966); Roberts v. Roberts, 292 S.W.2d 596
(Spr. Mo. App. 1956).
47. Cases cited note 46 supra.
48. Lodahl v. Papenberg, 277 S.W.2d 548 (Mo. 1955); Kelly v. Kelly, 329
Mo. 992, 47 S.W.2d 762 (1932).
49. Bennett v. Robinson, 180 Mo. App, 56, 165 S.W. 856 (Spr. Ct. App. 1914),
and Robinson v. Robinson, 268 Mo. 703, 186 S.W. 1032 (1916). These are com-
panion cases involving the same parties. Originally the wife was awarded a di-
vorce with custody, but no order of child support. In the first case cited she re-
covered for amounts expended, while the second case affirmed a 1912 modification
of the divorce decree to include an order for child support.
50. Hohler v. Fuchs, 156 S.W.2d 21 (St. L. Mo. App. 1941).
51. Lodahl v. Papenberg, 277 S.W.2d 548 (Mo. 1955); Kelly v. Kelly, 329
Mo. 992, 47 S.W.2d 762 (1932).
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previous to the order can be collected only in the common law suit, while
future support can be collected only under the continuing judgment.
While the order of continuing support acts as a judicial substitution
for the obligation to provide necessaries, only the court can declare the
magnitude of the duty, and the mother and father cannot change or de-
termine the obligation by agreement between themselves. 52 In Robinson
v. Robinson53 the mother had been awarded a divorce and custody with
no provision for child support, but the parties had executed an agreement
providing for a property settlement, alimony and child support. In review-
ing the wife's motion to modify the divorce decree to provide for child sup-
port, the Missouri Supreme Court held that the rights of the child to con-
tinuing support were paramount to the rights of the parents regardless of
the purpose or intention of the parties at the time of the original decree.54
Likewise, it has been held that the mother could not compromise future
obligations under an order of child support,55 though it may be possible
to release an indebted father from arrearages by compromise, but only as
against the mother.56 The underlying principle is that the right runs to the
child, himself, and the mother is merely the trustee for the purpose of en-
forcing the right. Therefore, the court has final authority to determine
the monetary value of the right, and the mother is unable to substitute her
own judgment for that of the court by contracting to accept less.
A father's obligation under a decree of continuing support can only
be satisfied by payment to the mother, and payment directly to the child
or others will not satisfy the obligation unless the mother expressly con-
sented.5 7 Such a requirement protects the position of the mother as trustee
in enforcing the child's right to support, and in determining how that sup-
port will be used to benefit the child. Thus, even payments to a child's bank
account while the child was away at college have been disallowed as credits
to an obligation under a decree of child support.58 The only exception to
52. Robinson v. Robinson, 268 Mo. 703, 186 S.W. 1032 (1916); Messmer v.
Messmer, 222 S.W.2d 521 (St. L. Mo. App. 1949); Cervantes v. Cervantes, 239 Mo.
App. 932, 203 S.W.2d 148 (Spr. Ct. App. 1947); Kershner v. Kershner, 202 Mo. App.
238, 216 S.W. 547 (K.C. Ct. App. 1919).
53. 268 Mo. 703, 186 S.W. 1032 (1916).
54. See also Bennett v. Robinson, 180 Mo. App. 56, 165 S.W. 856 (Spr. Ct.
App. 1914), an earlier case between the same parties where the mother succeeded
under the common law suit for necessaries provided. The lesson of these cases is
that a decree of divorce should always include provisions allocating a definite
amount as payment for child support whenever custody is given to the mother.
55. Messmer v. Messmer, 222 S.W.2d 521 (St. L. Mo. App. 1949); Cervantes v.
Cervantes, 239 Mo. App. 932, 203 S.W.2d 143 (Spr. Ct. App. 1947).
56. In Koenig v. Koenig, 191 S.W.2d 269 (St. L. Mo. App. 1945), a compromise
and release of an order of child support was held good against the mother, al-
though the court stated the release would not bind the children themselves. The
case was explained further in Messmer v. Messmer, 222 S.W.2d 521 (St. L. Mo. App.
1949), where the court said that the parties could compromise oniy amounts which
had already fallen due under a decree of support, and that the parties were with-
out capacity to compromise future payments.
57. Stemme v. Stemme, 351 S.W.2d 823 (St. L. Mo. App. 1961); Goeller v.
Goeller, 346 S.W.2d 545 (St. L. Mo. App. 1961); M_ v. M_ , 313 S.W.2d 209
(St. L. Mo. App. 1958); Steckler v. Steckler, 293 S.W.2d 129 (Spr. Mo. App. 1956).
58. Stemme v. Stemme, 351 S.W.2d 823 (St. L. Mo. App. 1961).
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the requirement that payments be made to the mother is where the mother
is guilty of some wrongdoing. Thus, in M__ v. M. ,59 where the moth-
er had left the children with their paternal grandparents, payments of sup-
port to the grandparents while they were keeping the children were allowed
as satisfaction of the obligation accruing during those periods.
The most difficult problem concerning judicial orders of support arises
when the duty terminates due to the emancipation of the child and the
father fails to secure a modification from the court reducing the order by
the amount of support originally granted for the emancipated child. The
situation first came before the Kansas City Court of Appeals in Swenson v.
Swenson,60 when a father sought to quash an execution on a decree of
support by showing that the child for whom support had been ordered had
joined the armed forces. The court held that the obligation of the father
to satisfy the order expired when the child's right to support terminated
by reason of his emancipation, a seemingly correct decision. The issue
arose again, on similar facts, in the St. Louis Court of Appeals in Schaffer
v. Security Fire Door Co.61 The St. Louis court, however, held that the
lower court was without authority to modify the judgment retroactively,
and that the mother had acquired a vested property right as each payment
accrued which could not be undermined by later declarations of the court.62
The question was certified to the Missouri Supreme Court for resolution
of the conflicting holdings, but the court found that the mother had con-
ceded that no amounts were due during the period the minor was in the
armed forces, so no dispute remained on the issue certified for clarifica-
tion.68
It is unfortunate that the supreme court failed to provide at least
dicta suggesting its views on the problem. The rationale of the St. Louis
court is inconsistent with the underlying theory of the decree of support.
The order for continuing support is not based on any right of the mother
against the father, but rather is the enforcement of the child's right to
support through the mother, who acts in a capacity similar to that of a
trustee. Therefore, the mother is not deprived of any property right when,
because the right of the child terminates at emancipation, 64 she can no
longer collect the decreed support in enforcement of the child's right. After
59. 313 S.W.2d 209 (St. L. Mo. App. 1958).
60. 241 Mo. App. 21, 227 S.W.2d 103 (K.C. Ct. App. 1950).
61. 326 S.W.2d 376 (St. L. Mo. App. 1959).
62. Id. at 379, 382.
63. Schaffer v. Security Fire Door Co., 332 S.W.2d 860 (Mo. 1960).
64. The St. Louis court justified enforcing the order of support after the
emancipation by considering the issue in terms of retroactive modification ofjudgments and vestiture of property rights in judgments. An equally good argu-
ment in support of its holding is the fact that the existence of an emancipation
is not always obvious, and the general rule is that persons asserting the emancipa-
tion of a minor have the burden of proof. Wurth v. Wurth, 322 S.W.2d 745
(Mo. En Banc 1959). Therefore, a court determination is necessary to find an
emancipation. However, because the existence of the duty to support is part of
the parent-child relationship (the termination of which is emancipation), existence
of an emancipation must really be determined on the basis of presumptions. Thus,
where a minor child has married or joined the armed services, no court determina-
tion is needed to know an emancipation has occurred.
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the time of emancipation there is no longer any duty and no longer any
right to enforce, and, logically, the judgment should abate just as it does
at the time of the father's death.6 5
To avoid confusion, a similar situation should be distinguished. In
Gordon v. Aiy, 66 the divorced mother had been awarded $80 per month
as support for two children. In support of a motion to quash a garnishment
on the decree, the father argued that since one of the children had been
emancipated by marriage his subsequent payments of $40 per month satis-
fied the obligation. The Kansas City Court of Appeals reversed the quash-
ing of the garnishment, holding that it could not be assumed that the lump
sum support was allocable pro rata between the two children. Often the
court considers the father's ability to pay as well as the needs of the chil-
dren in determining the amount of support, the Kansas City court reasoned,
and when one child is emancipated the original court might find that the
support payment for the remaining child exceeds his pro rata share of the
original order. The reasoning in Gordon67 is entirely consistent with the
theory underlying decrees of child support and should lead to one practical
conclusion for the practitioner: Decrees of child support should be sought
which indicate the basis on which the amount is determined and the al-
location among the children for which the benefits are decreed. In addi-
tion, the father, to be safe, should seek a modification immediately after an
emancipation is believed to have occurred.
The amount of an order for support is determined on the basis of the
needs of the children and the ability and financial situation of the father.68
Courts are lenient and consider the father's station in life in determining
what items are included in a child's needs.6 9 The best type of evidence to
support the request for an order of support is an actual record of itemized
costs over a recent period preceding the hearing.7 0 Obvious items to be in-
cluded within the definition of "needs" are food, clothing, shelter, medical
care, school expenses, and recreational expenses. 71 However, expenses for
all items should be presented, especially where the practice of providing
that item commenced before the breakup of the family. Courts have ac-
cepted showings of spending allowances, dry cleaning, haircuts and beauty
65. Gardine v. Cottey, 360 Mo. 681, 230 S.W.2d 731 (En Banc 1950).
66. 358 S.W.2d 81 (K.C. Mo. App. 1962).
67. Id.
68. McCann v. McCann, 448 S.W.2d 323 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969). But the fact
that the mother or the children have independent means or that the father has
very meager means will not discharge or excuse the father's duty of support. See
Brosam v. Brosam, 437 S.W.2d 694 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969).
69. Anderson v. Anderson, 437 S.W.2d 704 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969); Royster v.
Royster, 420 S.W.2d 1 (K.C. Mo. App. 1967).
70. Orders are sometimes affirmed when there is very little evidence in the rec-
ord. In Boyd v. Boyd, 459 S.W.2d 8 (St. L. Mo. App. 1970), there was evidence
only of the father's salary and the mother's expenses for food and rent. However,
cases are reversed if the appellate court finds there was no evidence of costs on
wlich to base the order of support. McCullough v. McCullough, 402 S.W.2d 623
(St. L. Mo. App. 1966); Nelson v. Nelson, 357 S.W.2d 228 (St. L. Mo. App. 1962).
71. Bagley v. Bagley, 460 S.W.2d 786 (St. L. Mo. App. 1970); Smolly v. Hoff-
man, 458 S.W.2d 579 (St. L. Mo. App. 1970); Anderson v. Anderson, 437 S.W.2d
704 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969).
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shop expenses, music or art lessons, hobby expenses, gifts, gasoline for
automobiles, and college expenses. 72
The court will consider the father's assets as well as his income in
determining the father's ability to provide support.73 Since courts will
not order an amount so excessive as to stifle the father's incentive,7 4 a
showing of his living expenses and "needs" are also relevant in determining
the upper limit of support. Again, the most convincing evidence of these
three factors is a record of actual dollar amounts involved within a recent
period. The trial court judge is given discretion in setting the amount of
support and is reversed only upon finding an abuse of discretion.75 However,
in reviewing the decision the appellate court follows the principles of
equity in considering all the facts de novo;7 6 therefore, establishing a firm
foundation of specific evidence on the relevant factors is an important part
of every case.77 Agreements between the parties have no binding effect on
the court since the parties are without capacity to agree to the amount, but
the courts do consider agreements between the parties as indicative of what
the parties consider a reasonable amount of support.78
The judicial determination is a final decree for purposes of execu-
tion;79 however, the amount of support may be modified by showing a
change in circumstances.8 0 Such circumstances can be a change in the chil-
dren's needs, 8 ' a change in the cost of providing those needs,8 2 such as in-
flation, or a change in the father's ability to provide support.8 3 The char-
acter of evidence needed to support such a modification is the same as that
of the original decree. A factual basis for the new order is needed as well
as the fact of the existence of a "change;" 8 4 therefore, a presentation of the
dollar amounts established in obtaining the original order, as well as the
dollar amounts over a recent period of time, should be introduced in evi-
72. Cases cited note 71 supra. These items listed are only illustrative. Counsel
representing the mother should take advantage of all the facts and present every
expense for the court's consideration.
73. Anderson v. Anderson, 437 S.W.2d 704 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969).
74. McCann v. McCann, 448 S.W.2d 323 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969).
75. Bryan v. Bryan, 452 S.W.2d 293 (Spr. Mo. App. 1970); McCann v. McCann,
448 S.W.2d 323 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969); McCullough v. McCullough, 402 S.W.2d
623 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966).
76. Anderson v. Anderson, 437 S.W.2d 704 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969); Sportsman
v. Sportsman, 409 S.W.2d 787 (K.C. Mo. App. 1966).
77. McCullough v. McCullough, 402 S.W.2d 623 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966);
Nelson v. Nelson, 357 S.W.2d 223 (St. L. Mo. App. 1962).
78. Houston v. Snyder, 440 S.W.2d 156 (Spr. Mo. App. 1969).
79. Partney v. Partney, 442 S.W.2d 117 (St. L. Mo. App. 1969); Royster v.
Royster, 420 S.W.2d 1 (K.C. Mo. App. 1967); Steckler v. Steckler, 293 S.W.2d 129
(Spr. Mo. App. 1956).
80. Jenkens v. Jenkens, 453 S.W.2d 619 (St. L. Mo. App. 1970); Anderson v.
Anderson, 437 S.W.2d 704 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969).
81. Bagley v. Bagley, 460 S.W.2d 736 (St. L. Mo. App. 1970); Royster v.
Royster, 420 S.W.2d 1 (K.C. Mo. App. 1967).
82. Smolly v. Hoffman, 458 S.W.2d 579 (St. L. Mo. App. 1970).
83. Bryan v. Bryan, 452 S.W.2d 293 (Spr. Mo. App. 1970); Anderson v. Ander-
son, 437 S.W.2d 704 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969).
84. McCullough v. McCullough, 402 S.W.2d 623 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966);
Nelson v. Nelson, 357 S.W.2d 223 (St. L. Mo. App. 1962).
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dence. Since the prior determination of the magnitude of the duty of sup-
port is res judicata as to those prior circumstances,8 5 the evidence must
show a difference in those amounts which will illustrate the "change" in
circumstances.
The order is enforced in Missouri, as any other judgment, through
procedures of execution and garnishment.8 6 Likewise, the judgment is sub-
ject to the normal ten year statutory limitation.8 7 The Missouri courts have
strictly maintained their refusal to enforce any type of order for support
of a wife through contempt procedures, although Missouri is the only state
taking such a position.8 8 The rationale that such enforcement would be a
violation of the constitutional guarantee against imprisonment for debt8 9
has been the subject of criticism.90 The position has been upheld, how-
ever, as recently as 1969, when the St. Louis Court of Appeals, in Partney v.
Partney,91 applied the no contempt restriction to orders for child support.
II. THE ILLEGITIMATE CHILD
The duty of a father to support his illegitimate child is one of the more
uncertain areas of Missouri law. This is a result of the 1968 decision of the
Missouri Supreme Court in R_ v. R ,92 which overturned the long
standing precedent that the father of an illegitimate was under no' duty
of support in the absence of a statute to the contrary.93 In that case 'the
court heldthat recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court9 4
85. McCullough v. McCullough, 402 S.W.2d 623 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966).
86. Partney v. Partney, 442 S.W.2d 117 (St. L. Mo. App. 1969); Royster v.
Royster, 420 S.W.2d 1 (K.C. Mo. App. 1967); Steckler v. Steckler, 293 S.W.2d 129(Spr. Mo. App. 1956).
87. Mayes v. Mayes, 342 Mo. 401, 116 S.W.2d 1 (1938); Hohler v. Fuchs, 156
S.W.2d 21 (St. L. Mo. App. 1941).
88. Schoenlaub, Use of Contempt Powers in the Enforcement of Alimony and
Support Decrees, 23 J. Mo. B. 396 (1967); Woods, The Fathers Have Eaten Sour
Grapes and the Children's Teeth Are Set on Edge-Ezekiel 18:12, 26 J. Mo. B.
560 (1970).
89. Mo. CONsT. art. I, § 11.
90. Authorities cited note 88 supra.
91. 442 S.W.2d 117 (St. L. Mo. App. 1969). According to the brief for plain-
tiff-appellant, the trial court refused to allow even an offer of proof to support
the motion for contempt. The brief alleged that defendant had not only refused
to make alimony and child support payments, but had
remarried, concealed all of his assets in his new wife's and business names
and informed plaintiff-appellant that neither she nor the courts of Mis-
souri [would] ever compel him to do anything he [did] not want to do.
Brief for Appellant at 10, Partney v. Partney, 442 S.W.2d 117 (St. L. Mo. App.
1969).
92. 431 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. 1968).
93. James v. Hutton, 373 S.W.2d 167 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963); State ex
rel. Canfield v. Porterfield, 222 Mo. App. 553, 292 S.W. 85 (K.C. Ct. App. 1927);
Easley v. Gordon, 51 Mo. App. 637 (St. L. Ct. App. 1892).
94. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), and Glona v. American
Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968). Levy concerned the denial of the
right of an illegitimate child to recover for the wrongful death of his mother on
the basis of the illegitimacy. The court held that to distinguish recovery on-- the
basis of legitimacy-illegitimacy was a violation of the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment to the U. S. Constitution. Glona concerned the right
of a mother to recover for the wrongful death of her illegitimate child.
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compel the conclusion that the proper construction of our statutory
provisions relating to the obligations and rights of parents (§§
452.150, 452.160, RSMo 1959, § 559.353 RSMo 1967 Supp.,
V.A.M.S.) affords illegitimate children a right equal with that of
legitimate children to require support by their fathers. Prior cases
to the contrary are no longer to be followed.9 5
The rationale of the decision was that to discriminate between legitimate
and illegitimate children for the purposes of determining the right to com-
pel support by their fathers was a violation of the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment of the U.S. Constitution and a violation of
Article I, section 2 and section 14 of the Missouri Constitution.
While this decision might seem to provide a just and certain answer
to the often criticized treatment the old Missouri law had given this
problem,96 the existence and the nature of a remedy for illegitimates and
their mothers is still uncertain. This uncertainty is due to another long
standing policy that children may not seek judicial enforcement of the duty
of support owed them by suing in their own behalf.9 7 Thus, no non-
statutory rights of action for support by an illegitimate child in his own
behalf could be maintained under a theory of equal protection since no
personal right to recovery is recognized as existing in legitimate children.
The statutory remedies given those acting in behalf of a legitimate child
contemplate situations in which the question of support of an illegitimate
child would never arise.98 In addition, prior cases99 which are not dearly
overruled by R - v. R - seem to construe all the relevant Missouri
statutes in such a way that illegitimate children and those acting on their
behalf may still be without a statutory remedy.
The precedent denying relief in the absence of statute was established
in Missouri by Easely v. Gordon o00 in 1892. There a suit by the mother of
an illegitimate child to enforce an express promise by the father to pay for
support of her child was unsuccessful. The court reasoned that since
the primary duty of support was on the mother of an illegitimate child,
her performance of that duty was not consideration sufficient to support
the putative father's promise to pay. In arriving at the conclusion that the
duty of support was on the mother rather than the father, the court looked
to the common law as it existed before 1607, as adopted by Missouri,10'
and found that in the absence of a statute to the contrary, the duty of sup-
95. R . v. R , 431 S.W.2d 152, 154 (Mo. 1968).
96. See 13 ST. L.U.L.J. 311 (1968); 1968 WAsH. U.L.Q. 624; 1953 WASH. U.L.Q.94.
97. Glaze v. Hart, 225 Mo. App. 1205, 36 S.W.2d 684 (K.C. Ct. App. 1931);
Worthington v. Worthington, 212 Mo. App. 216, 253 S.W. 443 (St. L. Ct. App.
1923); Huke v. Huke, 44 Mo. App. 308 (St. L. Ct. App. 1891).
98. § 452.070, RSMo 1969 concerning divorce; § 452.130, RSMo 1969 con-
cerning separate maintenance.
99. Heembrock v. Stevenson, 387 S.W.2d 263 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965);
James - v. Hutton, 373 S.W.2d 167 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963); State ex rel. Can-
field v. Porterfield, 222 Mo. App. 553, 292 S.W. 85 (K.C. Ct. App. 1927).
100. 51 Mo. App. 637 (St. L. Ct. App. 1892).
101. § 6561, RSMo 1889 [now § 1.010, RSMo 1969].
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port fell on the mother.102 Such a rule had particularly harsh results in view
of the fact Missouri had no bastardy or filiation statutes.10 3
Subsequent cases have attempted to find among the Missouri statutes
one which a court could construe as altering the common law rule, but no
such statute could be found. In James __ v. Hutton'0 4 the plaintiffs
argued that the criminal support statute'0 5 demonstrated the legislative in-
tent to change the duty of support, but the court held that criminal statutes
should be strictly construed, and that no such application of the statute
could be made. In State ex rel. Canfield v. Porterfield'0 6 a mother seeking
support for her illegitimate child argued that the 1919 versions of sections
452.150 and 452.160107 gave the mother of an illegitimate child a right
against the father for support, but the court held that the statutes would
only apply when the father was seeking custody or control of the child,
or the services, earnings or property of the child. Thus, where the putative
father was attempting to avoid all aspects of the paternal relation, the
common law rule remained unchanged.
Furthermore, the failure of the Missouri legislature to change the
common law rule was characterized as a tacit declaration of the public
policy of Missouri by the Kansas City Court of Appeals in James __ v.
Hutton'0 8 and affirmed by the St. Louis Court of Appeals in Heembrock v.
Stevenson.10 0 The Kansas City court looked at the legislative history of
three attempts in the preceding seventeen years to adopt remedial legis-
lation, and concluded that
[b]y such action the General Assembly has said that the public
policy of the State of Missouri is the law under the decisions of
the Supreme Court and Courts of Appeal which have held there
is no civil obligation for the support of illegitimate children as
far as the father ... is concerned."10
Thus, by 1965 Missouri's position among the three states' accepting the
minority view on support of illegitimates was characterized as a positive
public policy of the legislature.
102. Easley v. Gordon, 51 Mo. App. 637, 641 (St. L. Ct. App. 1892). Though it
is true that no obligation of support of an illegitimate was owed by the father
under common law, it is questionable whether a legal duty fell on the mother.
See Huke v. Huke, 44 Mo. App. 309 (St. L. Ct. App. 1891).
103. See James - v. Hutton, 373 S.W.2d 167 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963) and
Smull, Illegitimate Children-No Civil Liability for Support, 30 Mo. L. REV. 154(1965), concerning attempts of the Missouri legislature to adopt such legislation,
the purpose of which is to create for the illegitimate or his mother a civil cause
of action against a father for support of the child.
104. 373 S.W.2d 167 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963).
105. § 559.350, RSMo 1959 [now §§ 559.353, .356, RSMo 1969].
106. 222 Mo. App. 553, 292 S.W. 85 (K.C. Ct. App. 1927).
107. §§ 1813, 1814, and 1814a, RSMo 1919 [now §§ 452.150, .160, RSMo 1969].
See these statutes quoted note 40 supra.
108. 373 S.W.2d 167 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963).
109. 387 S.W.2d 263 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965).
110. James v. Hutton, 373 S.W.2d 167, 169 (K.C. Mo.App. 1963). See
Smull, supra note 103.
111. By 1965 only Texas, Idaho, and Missouri refused to give a civil remedy to
force support of an illegitimate by his father. Virginia recognizes the duty only
where the father has voluntarily and formally recognized the child. See Smull,
supra note 103, at 155.
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Although it is not clear from the court's opinion, the plaintiffs in
R _ v. R ,112 an illegitimate child by his mother as next friend and
the mother herself, sought a declaratory judgment of paternity and an order
of support against the father."83 The appeal was from the trial court's
action in sustaining defendant's motion to dismiss and the disposition by
the supreme court was to reverse and remand for further proceedings. In
doing so the court suggested in its opinion that the plaintiffs are entitled
to relief under a construction of sections 452.150 and 452.160, RSMo 1959,
and section 559.353, RSMo 1967.1 4 While the plaintiffs had not prayed for
relief under these statutes in their suit, in their brief to the Missouri Su-
preme Court they argued that under these statutes the courts were given
an implied power to declare support owing from the father. They contended
that the mother of an illegitimate is entitled to an adjudication of the
father's rights and duties in respect to custody and control of the child
and from this inferred a court's authority to decree child support, since the
judicial declaration of the mother's right to custody without the father's
duty of support would be valueless." 15
112. 431 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. 1968).
113. Brief for Appellant at 25, R v. R . 431 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. 1968).
114. Now §§ 452.150, .160, 559.353, .356, RSMo 1969. See statutes quoted note
40 supra. § 559.353, RSMo 1969:
Any man who, without good cause, fails, neglects or refuses to provide
adequate food, clothing, lodging, or medical or surgical attention for his
wife; or any man or woman who, without good cause, abandons or de-
serts or, without good cause, fails, neglects or refuses to provide adequate
food, clothing, lodging, or medical or surgical attention for his child born
in or out of wedlock, under the age of sixteen years, or if any person,
not the father or mother, having the legal care or custody of such minor
child, without good cause, fails, refuses or neglects to provide adequate
food, clothing, lodging, or medical or surgical attention for the child,
whether or not in either such case the child by reason of such failure,
neglect or refusal actually suffers physical or material want or destitution,
is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be punished
as provided by law.
§ 559.356, RSMo 1969:
Any man who leaves the state of Missouri and takes up his abode in
some other state and leaves his child under the age of sixteen years in
the state of Missouri, and, without just cause or excuse, fails, neglects or
refuses to provide his child with adequate food, clothing, lodging, or medi-
cal or surgical attention shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction
thereof shall be imprisoned by the department of corrections for a term of
two years. It shall be no defense to such charge that some person or or-
ganization other than the defendant has furnished food, clothing, lodging,
medical or surgical attention for said child or children, nor shall this statute
be construed so as to relieve said person from the criminal liability defined
herein for such omission merely because the mother of such child or chil-
dren, in case of the father, is legally entitled to the custody of such child
or children, nor because the mother of such child or children, or any other
person, or organization, voluntarily or involuntarily furnishes such neces-
sary food, clothing, shelter or medical or surgical attention, or undertakes
to do so.
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In spite of the language of the opinion in R__ v. R ,116 it seems
at least questionable that an illegitimate would be entitled to a decree of sup-
port in a suit solely on the basis of the statutes cited by the court. While the
construction of sections 452.150 and 452.160 in State ex rel. Canfield v.
Porterfield117 may have been overruled by R__ v. R_ ,11 8 it remains
difficult to justify granting relief to an illegitimate on the basis of equal pro-
tection when the statutes have never been construed as giving a right of
support in the case of legitimate children."19 Furthermore, the tradition that
criminal statutes create no civil remedy is a policy much broader than the
area of support of illegitimates.120 While the court implied that the proper
construction of the statutes gives the illegitimate his right to support, it is
really by judicial doctrine that the duty has been established. It was the
Supreme Court of Missouri, declaring what it found to be a requirement
of the federal and state constitutions, that established the duty.12 '
Since the right and duty have been established by judicial decree, a
better solution than merely suing under the statutes cited would seem to
be suit for determination of paternity by declaratory judgment. This would
be a remedy the illegitimate himself could seek, and while a successful de-
termination would entitle him to the same status and rights of support as
the legitimate child, there would be no violation of the doctrine preclud-
ing monetary recovery by the child in his own behalf.12 2 Such a remedy
was sought in James - v. Hutton,12 3 and though dismissal was sustained
the holding was based on the fact that the father of an illegitimate child
had no duty of support; therefore, no justiciable dispute was presented. In
State ex rel. Anonymous v. Murphy,124 the Kansas City Court of Appeals
acknowledged by dicta the appropriateness of a declaratory judgment of
paternity. However, the court refused to issue mandamus against a circuit
court judge to compel him to assume jurisdiction of a declaratory judgment
action seeking declaration of paternity because no personal jurisdiction over
the defendant had been obtained, and the result of a finding that the de-
fendant was the father would expose him to personal liability for support.
This dicta, then, indicated approval, in a case where personal jurisdiction
over the defendant is obtained, of an action under declaratory judgment for
a declaration of paternity.
For the Missouri mother of an illegitimate, therefore, the best ap-
proach would be that in R _ v. R 1_25 where the child through his
116. 431 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. 1968).
117. 222 Mo. App. 553, 292 S.W. 85 (K.C. Ct. App. 1927).
118. 431 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. 1968).
119. See annots., Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 452.150, .160 (Vernon 1952). See also
statutes quoted note 40 supra.
120. Christy v. Petrus, 365 Mo. 1187, 295 S.W.2d 122 (En Banc 1956).
121. Creating the right of support by judicial declaration was nothing unique.
This is the way Missouri first recognized the legitimate child's right to support.
See State ex rel. Kramer v. Carroll, 309 S.W.2d 654 (St. L. Mo. App. 1958), and cases
cited note 2 supra.
122. Worthington v. Worthington, 212 Mo. App. 216, 253 S.W. 443 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1923).
123. 373 S.W.2d 167 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963).
124. 354 S.W.2d 43 (K.C. Mo. App. 1962).
125. 431 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. 1968).
[Vol. 36
16
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [1971], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol36/iss3/3
COMMENTS
mother as next friend sought declaration of paternity and his mother
joined as plaintiff seeking a decree of support. It would seem that the dec-
laration of paternity would give him a status parallel to that of the legiti-
mate, as evidently required by the equal protection clause, while his mother,
as guardian, would be entitled to enforce her ward's duty of support as the
mother of a legitimate child is entitled to do. There is good authority in
Missouri for the granting of positive relief upon the status found in the
declaratory judgment suit,1 26 whether it be for the payment of money or
other equitable relief.
Whether a mother of an illegitimate in such a suit would be entitled
to a continuing judgment for child support, however, is questionable. Such
a judgment is given mothers of legitimate children only in conjunction
with actions for divorce or separate maintenance. 12 7 Therefore, it might be
difficult to justify an order for continuing support on the grounds of equal
protection since the remedy is denied many legitimate children and their
mothers. Because the order of support in the divorce-separate maintenance
situation is a judicial determination of the amount of support required of
a specific father which is substituted for his common law duty of support
arising out of the marital relation, 28 equal protection might not require
anything more than the minimum duty to provide the necessaries for
illegitimate children, and the remedy might be restricted to the common
law suit by a mother for reimbursement for amounts spent to provide those
necessaries. On the other hand, language in R____ v. R..129 and State v.
Murphy13o is broad enough that it could be argued the courts have ju-
dicially authorized such a remedy under their inherent equitable powers.
The issue could best be resolved by the legislature authorizing the courts
to entertain actions by illegitimates and their mothers for declaration of
paternity and a decree for continuing support. This solution, however, is
simply a filiation statute.' 31 The failure of the legislature to create by
statute even the right to support for the illegitimate makes it seem doubt-
ful that the legislature would now define such a remedy.
Two resourceful mothers of illegitimates have provided Missouri with
authority for compelling support by the father of an illegitimate by en-
forcing rights of the mother in a contract for marriage. In 1902, the plain-
tiff mother in Sponable v. Owens' 32 recovered a judgment for support pay-
ments the defendant father had promised to make in a marriage contract
executed after the birth of the illegitimate child. The defendant argued
that, under the authority of Easely v. Gordon, 33 the promise to pay for sup-
port of an illegitimate child was not supported by sufficient consideration.
However, the court found that because in the contract the plaintiff mother
126. Union Nat'l Bank v. Jessell, 358 Mo. 467, 215 S.W.2d 474 (1948); State
ex rel. Kramer v. Carroll, 309 S.W.2d 654 (St. L. Mo. App. 1958).
127. See statute quoted note 36 supra.
128. See cases cited note 45 supra.
129. 431 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. 1968).
130. 354 S.W.2d 43 (K.G. Mo. App. 1962). See also cases cited note 126 supra.
131. See James - v. Hutton, 373 S.W.2d 167 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963), and
Smull, supra note 103, regarding attempts by the Missouri legislature to adopt such
legislation.
132. 92 Mo. App. 174 (K.C. Ct. App. 1902).
133. 51 Mo. App. 637 (St. L. Ct. App. 1892).
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had promised to marry the defendant (as the defendant had also promised),
there was sufficient consideration in this promise of marriage to support
the promise of child support. It should be noted that the parties there had
in fact married and then divorced, and the plaintiff mother could have
compelled support on the basis of the former marital relation.
In Rehg v. Giancola,134 a 1965 St. Louis Court of Appeals case, this
remedy was carried a step further when the plaintiff mother recovered sup-
port for her illegitimate child as a part of the damages for breach of a
promise to marry. Here there was neither a written contract nor actual
marriage, but the plaintiff convinced the court that she had been persuaded
to enter sexual relations with the defendant only after he had asked and
promised to marry her. The court denied that the judgment was a result of
any duty the defendant father owed the child, but rather part of the
damages suffered as a result of the defendant's failure to perform his
promise of marriage. They found that the duty and the expense of mainte-
nance and support of the child, as well as medical expenses and loss of wages
due to plaintiff's pregnancy, were all burdens thrust on the plaintiff as a
result of defendant's breach which otherwise would have been borne by
the defendant.
This rather unique remedy may tend to be ignored in the future since
the decision in R_ . v. R 135 has subsequently established the father's
duty of support. In suits under the Sponable and Rehg principles the plain-
tiff not only must establish paternity, but must also show the existence of
the contract or promise to marry. There may be some advantages where
the extra proof is possible, however. While the duty under R_ . v.
R.____3 6 may be only to provide necessaries, the damages under the breach
of promise theory are the amounts of support lost due to the breach.137 Thus
where the defaulting party is relatively wealthy the damages should be more
than the mere necessaries for the child; they should be benefits of mainte-
nance and support at the standard of living of the father which the child and
his mother would have enjoyed had the father not breached his promise to
marry.
III. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this comment has been to summarize and analyze the
present state of Missouri law on child support and, hopefully, to draw at-
tention to the areas of inconsistency. Because problems arise so frequently,
child support is an area in which the law should be easily ascertainable and
well defined. The reluctance of the legislature to act in this regard has left
the task of revision and definition to Missouri courts. While the courts have
managed to build a workable system of rules on a case-by-case basis, de-
cisional law makes resolution of legal questions in the child support area a
complicated task. Summary and analysis of this decisional law can only
bring a slight improvement to the situation. Legislative reform and defini-
tion is needed.
STEPBEN D. HOYNE
134. 391 S.W.2d 934 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965).
135. 431 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. 1968).
136. Id.
137. Rehg v. Giancola, 391 S.W.2d 934 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965).
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COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A NEED FOR REFORM
Commercial arbitration has become an important method of resolving
many of the controversies arising in the business sector of our society.'
Arbitration is a process by which parties, either before or after disputes
arise, voluntarily agree to refer such disputes to an impartial third party,
the parties having agreed in advance that the award of the arbitrator shall
have finality.2 This comment will deal solely with commercial arbitration
as distinguished from labor arbitration, the latter being governed by its
own separate principles and practices,3 and will analyze the present status
of the law of commercial arbitration in Missouri and examine the possible
need for reform.
I. THE Ruux OF REVOCABILrry
A. Generally
At common law, executory arbitration agreements were not specifically
enforceable and thus were revocable by either party up to the time an
award was made. 4 The rule had its basis in the early fights in the common
law courts for jurisdiction, and in the fact that judges were jealous of any
thing which "ousted them of jurisdiction.' '4a There was, and still is, of
course, an action at law for damages for breach of the arbitration agree-
ment; however, this remedy has little practical utility because "unless the
plaintiff has been put to expense by reason of the defendant's refusal to
arbitrate, he can recover only nominal damages at law."4b
Currently there are two general approaches taken by jurisdictions in the
United States regarding specific enforcement of arbitration agreements.
Twenty-five jurisdictions, 5 including the United States Government,a pro-
vide by statute or judicial decision 6 that all agreements to arbitrate are
1. See generally M. DoivE, THE LA-W 8 PRACICE OF COAMERCLAL ARBITRA-
TION §§ 2.01-.02 (1968).
2. Id. § 1.01.
3. Grubb v. Leroy L. Wade & Son, Inc, 384 S.W.2d 528, 534 (Mo. 1964)
(stating ch. 435, RSMo 1959 is not applicable to labor arbitration).
4. Kill v. Hollister, 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (1746).
4a. Grossman, Commercial Arbitration in Missouri, 12 ST. L. L. REv. 299
(1927).
4b. Simpson, Specific Enforcement of Arbitration Contracts, 83 U. PA. L. Rv.
160-61 (1934).
5. See ALASI STAT. §§ 09.43.010 et seq. (Supp: 1970); Apiz. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 12-2501 (1962); CAL. Civ. PRO. § 1280 (1970); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 52-408
(1958); FLA. STAT. §§ 682.01-.22 (1965); HAWAII REv. LA Ws § 188-1 (1955); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 10, §§ 101-23 (1968); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:4201 (1965); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, § 706 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 7, §§ 1-23 (1965); MAss. ANN. LAws
ch. 251, § 1 (1959); MIcH. STAT. ANN. §27A.5001 (1962); MINN. STAT. § 572.08(1965); N.H. R.v. STAT. ANN. § 542.1 (1955); N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:24-1 (1951);
N.Y. Cnv. PRAc. §§ 7501-14 (McKinney 1963); OHso REv. CODE ANN. § 2711.01 (Page
1954); OR. R.Ev. STAT. § 33.210 (1953); PA. STAT. tit. 5, § 161 (1936); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 28-9-1 (1956); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-503 (b) (1957); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 7.04.010 (1961); WIS. STAT. § 298.01 (1963); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-1048 (1957).
5a. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1947).
6. See Ezell v. Rocky Mountain Bean & Elev. Co., 76 Colo. 409, 232 P. 680
(1925); United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Stine, 76 Nev. 189, 351 P.2d 965 (1960).
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valid, irrevocable, and specifically enforceable.ea Several other states,7 in-
cluding Missouri,8 enforce arbitration awards once entered, but apply the
common law rule of revocability as to specific enforcement of arbitration
agreements.0
Generally the Missouri position is to deny specific enforcement of any
type of arbitration agreement, whether it was entered into before or after
the dispute arose. A codification of the common law, section 435.010,
R-SMo 1969 provides:
Any contract or agreement hereafter entered into containing any
clause or provision providing for an adjustment by arbitration shall
not preclude any party or beneficiary under such contract or
agreement from instituting a suit or other legal action on such
contract at any time and the compliance with such clause or pro-
vision shall not be a condition precedent to the right to bring suit
or recover in such action. 10
This section was enacted in 1909 as an amendment to the original arbitra-
tion act adopted in 1825.11 The 1825 law, copied from a New York
act,12 did not prohibit specific enforcement of arbitration agreements,' 3
but in most of the Missouri cases based on this statute enforcement was
denied.' 4 One of the reasons given for these decisions was that, where a
contract leaves the price to be decided by arbitrators, an essential ingre-
dient of the contract is lacking and specific enforcement by a court "would
6a. Aksen, Resolving Construction Contract Disputes Through Arbitration, 23
ARn. J. (n.s.) 141, 147 (1968).
7. See AA. CODE tit. 7, § 829 (1957); APix. STAT. ANN. §§ 84-501 to -510
1947); DE.. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 5701-06 (1953); GA. CODE~ ANN. §§ 7-101,-201
S1925); IDAHO CoDE ANN. §§ 7-901 to -910 (1948); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 3-201 to -226
1946); IOWA CoDE §§ 679.1-.18 (1966); KAN. STAT. AN N. §§ 5-201 to -213 (1963);
Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 417.010-.040 (1963); Miss. CODE ANN. § 279 (1942); MONT. REv.
Cons ANN. § 93-201-1 (1947); NED. R, v. STAT. § 25-2102 (1964); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 22-3-1 (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-544 (1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-29-01 (1960);
S.C. CoDE ANN. § 10-1901 (1962); TENN. CODE ANN. § 22-501 (1956); TEx. Rav. Civ.
STAT, arts. 224-38 (1966); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31-1 (1953); W. VA. CODE ANN. §
55-10-1 (1966).
8. §§ 435.010-.020, RSMo 1969.
9. Aksen, Resolving Construction Contract Disputes Through Arbitration,
23 ARD. J. (n.s.) 141, 147 (1968). This is Mr. Aksen's opinion which is evidently
based on § 435.020, RSMo 1969. In fact, the Missouri cases indicate that while an
award is almost holy, agreements to arbitrate are not a bar to suit. Grossman, Com-
mercial Arbitration In Missouri, 12 ST. L. L. REv. (1927).
10. § 435.010, RSMo 1969.
11. Beatty, Voluntary Arbitration, Its Legal Status and How it Works, 22
U.K.C. L. REv. 191, 211 (1954).
12. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. §§ 7501-14 (McKinney 1963).
13. Present ch. 435, RSMo 1969, is identical to the original 1825 act except
for the addition of § 435.010.
14. See City of St. Louis v. St. Louis Gaslight Co., 70 Mo. 69 (1879); King v.
Howard, 27 Mo. 21 (1858). Bowen v. Lazalere, 44 Mo. 383 (1869) stated an excep-
tion to the rule:
It is not necessary that there be an award, for the consent to arbitrate is in
itself a selection of another tribunal and an agreement to transfer the cause
to that tribunal, which agreement the court will carry into effect wherever
it is properly brought to their notice. Id. at 386.
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be making a contract for them, and then executing it."'u The cases
decided since 1909 still hold that a provision for arbitration of a future
dispute is not specifically enforceable. 16
B. Condition Precedent Exception
Absent a statute prohibiting revocation, revocation is still not always
permissible. One method of preventing it is to make compliance with the ar-
bitration agreement a condition precedent to litigation. Such a rule was in
force in New York when the United States Court of Appeals said:
Either party may sue the other upon the contract without having
offered to arbitrate. He may be liable for damages for a breach of
his agreement to arbitrate; but the agreement will not bar his suit.
If, however, the contract stipulates that arbitration is to be a con-
dition precedent to the right to sue upon the contract, or if this may
be inferred upon construction, no suit can be maintained unless
the plaintiff has made all reasonable effort to comply with the
condition.17
This rule is no longer necessary in New York due to its statute' s allowing
specific enforcement of all arbitration agreements. Although the "condi-
don precedent" rule appears on its face to be the broadest exception to
revocability, it has not been used in Missouri, because of the language in
section 435.010 which provides that arbitration provisions "shall not be a
condition precedent to the right to bring suit or recover in such action."
Interestingly, the Missouri courts did recognize this exception in 1918
in dicta in Mecartney v. Guardian Trust Co.' 9 In that suit for attorney fees
the court found there was no agreement to arbitrate. However, the court
discussed the condition precedent exception and then went on, in dicta,
to say that even if they had found that there had been an agreement to
arbitrate it would have been too indefinite to specifically enforce, since it
did not provide a means of selecting arbitrators.20 In light of the fact that
the court ignored section 485.010 and that the finding of no agreement to
arbitrate was dispositive of the case, it seems that the court was using this
"indefiniteness" as a make-weight argument, and went too far in limiting
the condition precedent exception to revocability, since the defendant did
not'ask that the court enforce the "agreement" but only that jurisdiction
be refused until the condition had been complied with.21
15. City of St. Louis v. St. Louis Gaslight Co., 70 Mo. 69, 109 (1879). See also
Tureman v. Altman, 361 Mo. 1220, 239 S.W.2d 304 (En Banc 1951); King v.
Howard, 27 Mo. 21 (1858); Continental Bank Supply Co. v. International Bhd.
of Bookbinders, 239 Mo. App. 1247, 201 S.W.2d 531 (K.C. Ct. App. 1947).
16. Tureman v. Altman, 361 Mo. 1220, 239 S.W.2d 304 (En Banc 1951);
Ewing v. Pugh, 420 S.W.2d 14 (K.C. Mo. App. 1967); Jenks v. Jenks, 385 S.W.2d
370 (St. L. Mo. App. 1964); Hill v. Seaboard Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d
606 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963); State ex. rel. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Craig,
364 S.W.2d 343 (Spr. Mo. App. 1963).
17. Perkins v. United States Elec. Light Co., 16 F. 513, 515 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1883). See also Orrick v. Granell, 14 Alas. 94 (D. 1952); Ensley v. Associated Ter-
minals, 304 Mich. 522, 8 N.W.2d 161 (1943).
18. N.Y. Civ. PRec. §§ 7501-14 (McKinney 1963).
19. 274 Mo. 224, 202 S.W. 1131 (1918).
20. Id. at 258, 202 S.W. at 1141.
21. Id. at 224, 202 S.W. at 1131.
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Under section 435.010, even if a condition precedent were held to exist,
the party desiring arbitration would be forced to resort to litigation. If
the defaulting party refused to arbitrate, the other party, after having
made "all reasonable effort to comply with the condition,"22 is left with
only the remedy of litigation that he contracted to avoid through arbitra-
tion. This will necessarily be a suit on the merits of the case since section
435.010 does not allow specific enforcement of arbitration agreements.
C. Appraisal Exception
Generally, an agreement for an "appraisal" is specifically enforceable.
An appraisal award merely sets a value on the commodity or service in-
volved:
[A]greements to arbitrate are incapable of specific enforcement.
But though this is the general rule it is not the universal rule.
The rule has its well ascertained exception. This exception occurs
when the essence of the agreement does not consist in fixing of a
value by arbitrators, but the fixing of such value is merely sub-
sidiary or auxiliary to the principal agreement. 28
Such an agreement for valuation by appraisers does not oust the courts
of jurisdiction, but establishes a means of determining a disputed amount.2 4
Thus, this exception to the revocability rule is justified by the fact that,
prior to an award, no cause of action has accrued and any action brought is
premature.25
The leading case in Missouri distinguishing arbitration and appraisal
is Dworkin v. Caledonian Insurance Co. 2 6 Although the court discussed dif-
ferences in procedure, it appears the court was merely trying to protect
its own jurisdiction when it pointed out that "arbitrators act like judges"
in affixing liability (i.e., making a legal determination)2 7 while appraisers
make factual findings based on their own knowledge. The court also
pointed out that an arbitration award is itself a basis for suit and merges
with the original cause of action while the award through appraisal does
not create a new cause of action.28
The question decided by Dworkin was whether the statutory policy
of revocability29 of arbitration agreements should be extended to cover ap-
praisals.8 0 The court held the policy should not be extended because, quot-
ing Lord Campbell, "It would be a most inexpedient encroachment upon
the liberty of the subject if he were not allowed to enter such a contract."3'
The Dworkin court also quoted with approval the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia which said that an extension of the revocability rule to appraisals
22. Perkins v. United States Elec. Light Co., 16 F. 513 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1883).
23. Black v. Rogers, 75 Mo. 441, 449 (1882).
24. Bales v. Gilbert, 84 Mo. App. 675 (K.C. Ct App. 1900).
25. McNees v. Southern Ins. Co., 61 Mo. App. 335 (K.C. Ct. App. 1895).
26. 285 Mo. 342, 226 S.W. 846 (En Banc 1920).
27. Id. at 356, 226 S.W. at 848.
28. Id.
29. § 435.010, RSMo 1969.
30. Dworkin v. Caledonian Ins. Co., 285 Mo. 342, 226 S.W. 846 (En Banc 1920).
31. Id. at 361, 226 S.W. at 850.
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would "interfere with the ordinary transactions of mankind and put un-
necessary clogs on business."8 2
II. VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION IN MISSOURI
Section 435.02033 appears to permit submission of an existing contro-
versy to arbitration if it is subject to action, and the parties agree that a
judgment should be entered on the award. 4 Section 435.010, however, pre-
cludes compulsory submission; thus section 435.020 merely recognizes
purely voluntary arbitration.3 5 In other words, judicial enforcement will
be given to an award resulting from the parties having voluntarily gone to
arbitration.
In this connection, Missouri courts have distinguished between common
law arbitration and statutory arbitration. The distinction is made to test
the validity of the agreement submitting the controversy to arbitration under
section 485.020. This is necessary due to the differences in common law and
statutory arbitration. At common law the dispute did not have to rise to
the level of a controversy and the submission agreement and award only
had to be in writing if required by the statute of frauds. Under section
435.020 the dispute must rise to the level of a cause of action and both the
submission agreement and the award must be in writing. This is the only
reason for any distinction, as each type is regarded as a distinct and con-
current remedy aiming at the same result.3 6 The two types of arbitration
differ in (1) the formality of the agreement, and (2) the level to which the
controversy must rise. The cases discussing the distinction have in common
the fact that an existing controversy, rather than a possible future dispute,
was the subject of arbitration.3 7
The first element of statutory submission under section 435.020 requires
that the submission agreement be in writing, while at common law it
could be either parol or written,8 except that where the subject matter
32. Id.
33. § 435.020, RSMo 1969:
All persons, except infants and persons of unsound mind, may, by instru-
ment of writing, submit to the decision of one or more arbitrators any con-
troversy which may be existing between them, which might be the subject
of an action, and may, in such submission, agree that a judgment of any
circuit or other court having jurisdiction of the subject matter, to be desig-
nated in such submission, shall be rendered upon the award made pursuant
to such submission.
34. Beatty, Voluntary Arbitration, Its Legal Status and How It Works, 22
U.K.C. L. REv. 191 (1954).
35. Grossman, Commercial Arbitration in Missouri, 12 ST. L. L. Rlv. 229
(1927).
36. Thatcher Implement &c Mercant. Co. v. Brubaker, 193 Mo. App. 627, 187
S.W. 117 (K.C. Ct. App. 1916).
37. Continental Bank Supply Co. v. International Bhd. of Bookbinders, 239
Mo. App. 1247, 201 S.W.2d 531 (K.C. Ct. App. 1947); Rickman v. White, 266 S.W.
997 (Spr. Mo. App. 1924); Bunnell v. Reynolds, 205 Mo. App. 653, 226 S.W. 614
(K.C. Ct. App. 1920); Thatcher Implement & Mercant. Co. v. Brubaker, 193 Mo.
App. 627, 187 S.W. 117 (K.C. Ct. App. 1916); Donnell v. Lee, 58 Mo. App. 288
(K.C. Ct. App. 1894); Carter v. Skaggs, 38 Mo. 302 (1866).
38. Thatcher Implement & Mercant. Co. v. Brubaker, 193 Mo. App. 627,
187 S.W. 117 (K.C. Ct. App. 1916).
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of the contract was within the Statute of Frauds the submission agreement
had to be in writing.89 The fact that submission is in writing, however,
does not in and of itself make the agreement statutory.40 The second ele-
ment of statutory submission requires that it have as its subject matter a
controversy which could be the subject of a civil action.41 A common law
submission on the other hand, while it must have as its subject matter an
existing controversy, need not rise to the level of a cause of action.42
Once the parties to an arbitration agreement have voluntarily sub-
mitted their dispute to arbitration, the decision of the arbitrators, the
award, is highly regarded by the courts. Arbitration, in the words of the
Missouri Supreme Court, is like "a domestic tribunal, and the arbitrators
are judges of the parties own choosing, and are favored by both the courts
and lawmaking power.' 43 While the courts view arbitration agreements
as threats to their jurisdiction and a deprivation of the parties' right to a
day in court, there is nothing but praise for arbitration awards. The Mis-
souri court has described arbitration and how it works in glowing terms as:
a domestic tribunal, created by the will and consent of parties
litigant, and resorted to to avoid the expense, delay, and ill feeling
consequent upon litigating in courts of justice. The arbitrators
are generally selected from among the friends of the parties, and
are not supposed to be well versed in the law, or the technical
rules of evidence; but are expected to settle all matters in dispute
untrammelled by the niceties of the law, and in a manner that will
be just and equitable between the parties; and so favored is this
tribunal by our courts that they will not [normally] interfere with
an award .... 44
The courts have upheld awards saying that mere errors of law or wrong
conclusions were not sufficient to upset an award4 5 without a showing of
some impropriety by the arbitrators.
The description of arbitration by the Missouri court may not be com-
pletely accurate today because arbitrators are presently chosen largely from
the legal profession by the various trade and arbitration associations, and
are generally not acquainted with the parties; 4 6 but the quoted material
39. Rickman v. White, 266 S.W. 997 (Spr. Mo. App. 1924); Bunnell v.
Reynolds, 205 Mo. App. 653, 226 S.W. 614 (K.C. Ct. App. 1920); Donnell v. Lee,
58 Mo. App. 288 (K.C. Ct. App. 1894).
40. Continental Bank Supply Co. v. International Bhd. of Bookbinders, 239
Mo. App. 1247, 201 S.W.2d 531 (K.C. Ct. App. 1947).
41. Id. See also § 435.020, RSMo 1969.
42. Continental Bank Supply Co. v. International Bhd. of Bookbinders, 239
Mo. App. 1247, 201 S.W.2d 531 (K.C. Ct. App. 1947); § 435.020, RSMo 1969.
43. Garred v. Macy, 10 Mo. 161, 164 (1846).
44. Bennet's Adm'r v. Russell's Adm'x, 34 Mo. 524, 528 (1864).
45. Id. See also Cochran v. Bartle, 91 Mo. 636, 3 S.W. 854 (1887); Bridgeman
v. Bridgeman, 23 Mo. 272 (1856); Vaughn v. Graham, 11 Mo. 575 (1848); Newman
v. Labeaume, 9 Mo. 30 (1845); Fernandes Grain Co. v. Hunter, 217 Mo. App. 187,
274 S.W. 901 (St. L. Ct. App. 1925); Becket v. Wiglesworth, 178 S.W. 898 (K.C.
Mo. App. 1915); Taylor v. Scott, 26 Mo. App. 249 (St. L. Ct. App. 1887); State
ex. rel. Kennedy v. Union Merchants' Exch., 2 Mo. App. 96 (St. L. Ct. App. 1876);
Mitchell v. Curran, 1 Mo. App. 453 (St. L. Ct. App. 1816).
46. M. Dozux, Comi ERClAL ARBITRATION 14 (1965).
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is still an accurate summary of the reasons for electing to arbitrate and
the purposes that arbitrators hope to achieve.47
So long as an arbitration agreement is carried through to an award,
the courts will not question the agreement because the mutual promises
to submit to arbitration are consideration for each other.48 The preven-
tion of litigation is not only a sufficient consideration, but one highly
favored by our courts. 49 Thus the court will not look into the character
of the claims submitted for the purpose of setting aside the compromise. 0
The submission statute51 requires that there be an existing controversy
between the parties. The Kansas City Court of Appeals has held, however,
that when they are asked to set aside an award it is sufficient that the
parties thought, at the time, that there was a dispute.52 Also, a mere show-
ing that the award is contrary to law or against the weight of the evidence
is insufficient to set aside the award.53 Courts liberally interpret arbitration
proceedings on the theory that justice -may be promoted by submission to
an arbitration tribunal which can consider facts that courts bound by the
strict rules of evidence can not consider.54
Although there are means of attacking an award once it has been made,
it appears to be very difficult, under both section 435.100 and case law, to
set aside an award. Section 435.100 provides that an arbitration award can
be set aside on any one of four separate grounds: (1) the award was pro-
curred by corruption or fraud; (2) evident partiality or corruption on the
part of the arbitrator; (3) the arbitrator was guilty of misconduct in refus-
ing to hear evidence, refusing to postpone the hearing when good cause
is shown, or by engaging in any misbehavior prejudicing the rights of the
parties; and (4) the arbitrator exceeded his powers. In Mitchell v. Curran55
an arbitration award was granted to the defendant. This award was set
aside by an appeals committee and on rehearing the arbitrators found for
the defendant again. The appeals committee again set aside the award and
gave a $600 award for the plaintiff. This award was confirmed by the
circuit court and defendant moved to set aside the award. The court noted
that even though there was no evidence to support an award for the plaintiff
they could not set aside the award. The court in Mitchell set out five
grounds for setting aside an award, adding only one ground of attack in
addition to the statutory grounds: insufficiency of the award. In addition
to this listing of grounds which may be used to upset an award, the court
noted that section 435.240, which denies any impairment of the powers of
equity, does not authorize the setting aside of an award merely because it
is against the weight of the evidence. 56 The cases decided under section
47. Id. at 8-12.
48. Downing v. Lee, 98 Mo. App. 604, 73 S.W. 721 (K.C. Ct. App. 1903).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. § 435.020, RSMo 1969.
52. Downing v. Lee, 98 Mo. App. 604, 73 S.W. 721 (K.C. Ct. App. 1903).
53. Fernandes Grain Co. v. Hunter, 217 Mo. App. 187, 274 S.W. 901 (St. L.
Ct. App. 1925).
54. Masonic Temple Ass'n v. Farrar, 422 S.W.2d 95 (St. L. Mo. App. 1967).
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435.100 have held that, in order for an award to be set aside, the error must
appear on the face of the award, 57 and that the court cannot review arbitra-
tors' conclusions of law.58 It seems that in order to set aside an award under
section 435.100, corruption, partiality or some misconduct calculated to
prejudice one of the parties must be shown.59
It is anomalous that our legislature protects merchants from specific
enforcement of arbitration agreements by providing that they will not bar
an action; yet, when these contracts are carried out, the courts look upon
them with favor, and interpret them with liberality.60 Arbitration awards
receive the presumption of legality given judgments. 61 This is demonstrated
by the fact that, as previously noted, wrongful intent of arbitrators is re-
quired to upset an award,62 and the fact that courts can not review the
arbitrators' conclusions of law.63 In addition, mere error in judgment as
to law or fact will not vitiate an award,6 4 nor will any error which is not
apparent on the face of an award.65 It might be inferred from the disparity
between legislative and judicial conceptions of public policy that the courts
are willing and anxious to adopt a modem arbitration rule and are pro-
viding the legislature with excellent policy reasons for updating the Mis-
souri statute. For example, in Masonic Temple Association v. Farrar,66 the
court expressed the feeling that, when controversies arise between persons
or groups linked by common interests, arbitration should be used so that
facts inadmissible in courts bound by rules of evidence could be con-
sidered. In Farrar the groups involved were linked fraternally and the court
indicated that arbitration would serve to protect amicability.6 7 It could
be argued that groups linked by economic ties should use arbitration to
maintain useful economic ties.
II. IMPETUS FOR A NE-w Rur
One reason advanced for the establishment of the general rule6 8 that
arbitration agreements can not be specifically enforced was that public
57. Valld v. North Mo. R.R., 37 Mo. 445 (1866).
58. Higgins-Wall-Dyer Co. v. City of St. Louis, 331 Mo. 454, 53 S.W.2d 864
(1932).
59. Bennet's Adm'r v. Russell's Adm'x, 34 Mo. 524 (1864).
60. Id. See also Tucker v. Allen, 47 Mo. 488 (1871); Fernandes Grain Co. v.
Hunter, 217 Mo. App. 187, 274 S.W. 901 (St. L. Ct. App. 1925); Reeves v. Mc-
Glothlin, 65 Mo. App. 537 (K.C. Ct. App. 1896).
61. Thatcher Implement & Mercant. Co. v. Brubaker, 193 Mo. App. 627, 187
S.W. 117 (K.C. Ct. App. 1916).
62. Fernandes Grain Co. v. Hunter, 217 Mo. App. 187, 274 S.W. 901 (St. L.
Ct. App. 1925).
63. Higgens-Wall-Dyer Co. v. City of St. Louis, 331 Mo. 454, 53 S.W.2d 864
(1932).
64. Bridgeman v. Bridgeman, 23 Mo. 272 (1856); Vaughn v. Graham, 11 Mo.
575 (1848); State ex. rel. Kennedy v. Union Merchants' Exch., 2 Mo. App. 96 (St.
L. Ct. App. 1876).
65. Cochran v. Bartle, 91 Mo. 636, 3 S.W. 854 (1887); Taylor v. Scott, 26 Mo.
App. 249 (St. L. Ct. App. 1887).
66. 422 S.W.2d 95 (St. L. Mo. App. 1967).
67. Id.
68. By a count of the American jurisdictions this is not a majority rule. There
are twenty-one states which by statute or court decision follow this rule. See statutes
cited note 7 supra.
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policy was opposed to allowing persons to bind themselves prior to a con-
troversy. Additional reasons advanced for this rule were lack of predicta-
bility of result, 69 and the fact that results of past arbitration cases would
not generally be available to the parties. 70 Both of these considerations
stem from the fact that arbitration decisions are not reported 7l and the
fact that, while arbitration associations have the machinery available to
keep records and thus have precedent to cite, the individual small business-
man will be unable to maintain such records. Another objection to arbi-
tration proceedings was a fear of possibly unfair results which could be
obtained if the rules of evidence were not followed.7 2 This fear may have
been somewhat exaggerated because eighty percent of the arbitrators ap-
pointed are lawyers73 who, while not bound by strict rules of evidence, are
undoubtedly familiar with them and arguably will not subvert their
spirit.
The factors of encroachment on liberty and unnecessary dogs on busi-
ness cited by the Dworkin court constitute not only good reasons for not
extending the revocability rule to appraisals, they also present an excellent
rationale for abrogating the rule altogether. The recent trend in the courts
has been to question the rule which invalidates agreements to arbitrate
future disputes.74 This is also the definite trend in the legislatures.7 5 The
philosophy underlying this can be seen in a case decided in 1899 by the
Montana Supreme Court,7 6 which, while adhering to the statutory pro-
hibition,7 7 noted the weakness of the rule:
[I]f it were not so firmly and well-nigh universally established, we
apprehend that it would be overturned, as resting upon no solid
foundation of reason. Its operation should not be extended by
construction, nor should it ever be invoked to nullify or impair
contractual provisions not dearly infected with the supposed evils
intended to be cured or prevented.78
As long as the parties, at arms length, provide for an amicable adjustment
by arbitration it is difficult to find any good reason why the provision
should be unenforceable.7 9
In one of the early cases abrogating the common law rule of revoca-
bility, the Colorado Supreme Court said of the rule:
69. Annot., 135 A.L.R 79 (1941).
70. M. DoME, COmmtRCLti ARBITRATION 14 (1965).
71. Id.
72. Note, Commercial Arbitration: Expanding The Judicial Role, 52 MINN.
L. REv. 1218 (1968).
73. M. DoaxE, CoMmRcIAL APR-BIATON 14 (1965).
74. Annot., 135 A.L.R. 79, 92 (1941).
75. See statutes cited note 3 supra.
76. Cotter v. Grand Lodge A.O.U.W., 23 Mont. 82, 57 P. 650 (1899).
77. See MoNT. RrEv. CODEs ANN. § 93-201-1 (1947).
78 Cotter v. Grand Lodge A.O.U.W., 23 Mont. 82, 57 P. 650 (1899).
79. Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 50 N.Y. 250, 258
(1872); 26 WAsH. U.L.Q. 561 (1941). Even though this sentiment is expressed in
a New York case it should be noted that this case was decided at a time when the
New York statute was identical to present Missouri law.
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The reason upon which it was based does not appeal to us. Inas-
much as parties to a dispute may decline to litigate, we see no
reason why they may not contract to so refrain, or contract to
settle their differences in any other lawful manner.8 0
The Colorado court took this step on its own, without action on the part
of the legislature, under a statute very similar to Missouri section 485.020.81
Section 435.010 would, however, bar such a judicial modernization in Mis-
souri.
Although the rule of revocability may have been a good rule when
business was local and small in scale,8 2 the nineteenth and twentieth cen-
turies have seen an expansion of business and a corresponding growth in
business disputes. 83 The number of courts has not grown in the same pro-
portion.8 4 Today, disputes are more numerous and more complex,8 5 and
expenses and delays in litigation have multiplied 6 because courts are
unable to handle the increased caseloads. Furthermore, courts today, in
view of this burden of increasing caseloads, are less concerned about en-
croachments on their jurisdiction. The rather obvious solution to this
problem is to allow the businessman to pick experts in his line of business
to hear and settle commercial disputes quickly and justly.87
One of the primary factors behind the growing desire for arbitration
is the ease and rapidity with which disputes are resolved. Arbitration is
speedier than litigation because in each case the panel of arbitrators chosen
by the parties is able to get to the case immediately, and is not hindered
by a crowded court calendar.8 8 Arbitration is more expedient due to simpli-
fied procedures and informality in presenting evidence.8 9 The use of
experts as arbitrators removes the need for each side to call expert wit-
nesses to explain trade practices to the court.9 0 Evidence will be received
before it becomes stale, and capital will not be tied up for long periods
in anticipation of possible future judgments. 9 ' Arbitration is less expen-
sive to the parties, as some arbitrators serve without pay, fewer records
are required, and less time by the businessman and his attorney is spent
in arbitration than in litigation.9 2 The public also benefits from this say-
80. Ezell v. Rocky Mountain Bean & Elevator Co., 70 Colo. 409, 232 P. 680(1925).
81. 314 COLO. CODE CIv. PRO. § 1 (1921):
That all controversies, which may be the subject of a civil action, may be
submitted to the decision of one or more arbitrators, in the manner and
with the effect indicated in this act.
82. Grossman, Commercial Arbitration in Missouri, 12 ST. L. L. REv. 229, 230(1927).
83. Id. at 231.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 231-32.
87. Id. at 232.
88. Note, Commercial Arbitration: Expanding The Judicial Role, 52 MINN. L.
Rv. 1218, 1219 (1968).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1220.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1221-22.
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ing because all expenses of arbitration are born by the parties themselves.9 3
In addition, the parties are given more freedom to contract, to deter-
mine the place and time of arbitration, to choose the applicable law, and
to conduct private proceedings, thereby protecting business reputations,
trade secrets, and useful business relationships.9 4 To parties who desire
continuing contractual relations in the future, a prompt decision, reason-
ably arrived at, is more valuable than a decision derived through the judi-
cial process after months or years of costly litigation.9 5
It should also be pointed out that an agreement to arbitrate does
not attempt to oust the courts of jurisdiction any more than does a release
of all right of action.906 The court is at most deprived of deciding the merits
of the case but still has jurisdiction to entertain an action and issue a
decree in conformance with the award9 7 In addition, if there is any im-
propriety in the arbitration proceeding, the court may disregard the award
and determine the issue on its merits.98
It has been suggested by some writers that there is no good reason for
a rule of revocability, other than preventing parties from unwisely binding
themselves.
Since there is nothing immoral, or detrimental to the public in
stipulations to arbitrate any and all disputes that may arise be-
tween the parties to a private contract, it seems that the most that
can be said in support of the rule against such stipulations is that
they are, in general, unwise. But unwisdom is surely a strange
ground for the invalidation of contracts.99
The factors favoring the adoption of a more permissive arbitration
statute seem to outweigh by far the arguments against it. This is especially
true when it is kept in mind that a permissive statute does not force every
contract dispute into arbitration. All that is sought is the opportunity to
enter into enforcible arbitration agreements, for those parties desiring to
do so.
IV. PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE MISSOURI STATUTE
There have been some rather strong citicisms of the present Missouri
statute:
The Missouri statute of arbitration was adopted in 1825, and con-
tinued practically unchanged since then. The section just quoted
[present section 435.010] was adopted by our legislature in 1909,
It is a blot upon our statute book. There is no reason, no sense,
no excuse for it. . . . This section should not only be repealed,
but, to the contrary, agreements to arbitrate should expressly be
made irrevocable after they have once been fairly entered into.1 00
93. Id. at 1221.
94. Id.
95. Foster, Arbitrations and Appraisals in the Missouri Courts, 1954 WASH.
U.L.Q. 49 (1954).
96. 26 WASH. U.L.Q. 561, 562 (1941).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 562-63.
99. Annot., 135 A.L.R. 79 (1941).
100. Werner, Progress in Voluntary Tribunals, 4 ST. L. L. Rxv. 61, 66 (1919).
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Clearly, the existence of the revocability rule in Missouri is anachro-
nistic and some change is indicated. Chapter 435 could be improved in
any of three ways: (1) repeal of present section 435.010; (2) repeal of entire
chapter 435 and replacement with the amended New York Act;' 01 (3)
repeal of entire chapter 435 and replacement with the Uniform Arbitra-
tion Act.10 2
The simplest method would involve the repeal of section 435.010,
the only offensive provision in chapter 435, thereby allowing judicial
adoption of a rule specifically enforcing arbitration agreements. This would
be a satisfactory change in that it could be anticipated, given the flexi-
bility of the courts, that a rule fair to all would be formulated by judicial
decision. The uncertainty with which contract draftsmen would be faced
in the interim mitigates strongly against this approach, however.
Bearing in mind that most of chapter 435 was borrowed from New
York, there is a certain logic in following that state's lead in amending its
arbitration statutes. There are three basic differences in these two statutes:
(1) New York law allows the specific enforcement of agreements to arbitrate
future disputes; 103 (2) in New York a submission of an existing dispute
is irrevocable;' 04 and (8) in New York one party to an arbitration agree-
ment can force arbitration by a simple motion in court, while in Missouri
only an award can be specifically enforced.105 New York amended its
original arbitration statute in 1919, after Missouri had copied it,106 for
three basic reasons: (1) the judicial procedure of the original act was not
adapted to settling modem business disputes; (2) cost of litigation was
too high; and (3) the judge and jury have no technical qualifications to
decide commercial disputes and expert witnesses tend to confuse them.10 7
It seems Missouri would be well advised to follow the example of a lead-
ing commercial state in the nation and thus profit from its experience in
the field of commercial arbitration. Were Missouri to adopt the New York
act, it would have not only a modem arbitration statute but a body of
ready-made case law interpreting that modem statute.
Another alternative would be to adopt the Uniform Act. The Uni-
form Act is presently in force in at least seven jurisdictions.10 8 The major
difference in the Uniform Act and chapter 435 is section 435.010. The
Uniform Act expressly authorizes specific enforcement of agreements to
101. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. §§ 7501-14 (McKinney 1963). For a comparison of the
Missouri and New York statutes, see Grossman, Commercial Arbitration In Mis-
souri, 12 ST. L. L. REv. 229 (1927).
102. 9 U.L.A. 78 (1957) [hereinafter referred to in the text as Uniform Act and
cited in the footnotes as UAA].




107. Id. at 240.42.
108. AAsKA STAT. §§ 09.43.010 (Supp. 1970); Amiz. R:Ev. STAT. ANN. § 12-1501
(1962); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 10, §§ 101-23 (1968); MD. ANN. CoDE art. 7, §§ 1-23
(1965); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 251, § 1 (1959); MiNN. STAT. § 572.08 (1965); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 1-1048.1 (1957).
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arbitrate. 109 A further difference is that the Uniform Act provides a pro-
cedure to compel or stay an arbitration proceeding"O (the Missouri statute
has no need for such a provision.) There are, of course, other differences
in the Uniform Act and the Missouri statutes. The Missouri statute does
not provide for court-appointed arbitrators in lieu of party-appointed
arbitrators, whereas the Uniform Act does. 1 The Uniform Act expressly
provides for the right of the parties to present evidence,"l2 while Missouri
grants this right only inferentially in that an award can be set aside for
failure of the arbitrators to hear material evidence.113 Another difference
is that the Uniform Act allows the arbitration to proceed without all
arbitrators present, 114 while Missouri requires all to be present. 1 5 The
Uniform Act also provides for the right to counsel,116 payment of witness
fees,11 a time limit on making an award,"18 and that any application to
the court can be made by motion,11 9 while the Missouri statute has no
similar provisions. The Missouri statute provides for arbitrators' fees of
two dollars and fifty cents per day 2 0 and that any confirmation of an
award must be made in open court,12 while the Uniform Act is silent on
these points.
The Uniform Act and the Missouri statute are similar in their remain-
ing provisions. Both require a majority of arbitrators to act,12 2 and grant
a power on the part of the arbitratorq to select the meeting time and place
and to provide notice for the meeting. 23 The Uniform Act gives arbitra-
tors the power to conduct depositions 24 and the Missouri statute gives
them the power of magistrates.' 2 5 The two statutes are very similar in the
provisions setting out grounds for vacating an award, 2 6 obtaining a re-
hearing,1 27 rendering judgment,128 determining judgment format, 2 9 and
selecting venue.'3 0
It is submitted that any of the above three reform suggestions will
109. UAA § 1.
110. Id. § 2.
111. Id. § 3.
112. Id. §5(b).
113. § 435.100, RSMo 1969.
114. UAA § 5 (c).
115. § 435.040, RSMo 1969.
116. UAA § 6.
117. Id. § 7 (d).
118. Id. § 8(b).
119. Id. § 16.
120. § 435.280, RSMo 1969.
121. § 435.080, RSMo 1969.
122. UAA § 4; § 435.060, RSMo 1969.
123. UAA § 5 (a); § 435.050, RSMo 1969.
124. UAA § 7 (b).
125. § 435.040, RSMo 1969.
126. UAA § 12 (b); § 435.120, RSMo 1969.
127. UAA § 12 (c); § 435.130, RSMo 1969.
128. UAA § 14; § 435.150, RSMo 1969.
129. UAA § 15; § 435.160, RSMo 1969.
130. UAA § 18 is identical with the normal venue provisions in Missouri under
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improve the climate for commercial arbitration in Missouri. At the very
least, however, section 435.010 should be repealed and replaced with sec-
tions 1 and 2 of the Uniform Act. It is probably preferable, however, for
the sake of completeness and uniformity, for Missouri simply to adopt
either the current New York statutes or the Uniform Act.
GERALD D. McBETH
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